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Abstract—Social networks have been growing and evolving
from mere means of communication into the biggest potential
global market and access platform to hundreds of millions of
customers ever built. However, although companies and organi-
sations can have access to millions of potential customers almost
in an instant, being able to identify the best initial entry points for
introducing innovation (be it a service or product) is key to aiding
its acceptance and enhancing its prospects of further diffusion
into the market. In this paper, by using the economic model
of return to scale, we investigate a mechanism for identifying
these potential best initial entry points for introducing innovation
in social networks in terms of its efficiency and a cost-benefits
analysis. We present a set of experiments based on two real social
network datasets and also a synthetic one that shows the effects
of deploying our mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Social networks have rapidly grown to become the largest
potential market ever to have emerged. Hundreds of millions
of people worldwide are seen as potential customers by firms.
However, although firms can have access to growing numbers
of customers through social networks, new challenges have
emerged as being able to identify the best initial entry points
for introducing innovation (be it a service or product) is a
key issue. Traditional approaches to introducing innovation are
no longer applicable, since the nature and dynamics of such
networks require more sophisticated solutions.
Although there exist different market techniques and models
that help shed light on the process of introducing innova-
tion, the majority of them are mostly ad-hoc solutions that
may apply only to particular types of products or specific
markets. Most opinions on this topic agree on the two main
characteristics that most significantly affect an innovation’s
success: adoption and diffusion. Seminal works by [Bass1969]
and [Rogers1995] have progressed on the field, but they are
oriented towards traditional markets. Moreover, the focus of
these works is on what happens once innovation is introduced
into the market, but not before, since they do not examine what
could be the best entry points to initiate product adoption and
diffusion or how a firm would be able to identify these in
the first place and/or choose among them. So although there
is increasing interest in social networks, work on innovation
seeding in such networks has been limited.
The linear threshold model proposed by [Granovetter1978]
postulates the existence of a subset of individuals in a network
– the seed set – who have already adopted the innovation. The
other members of the social network subsequently adopt the
innovation if the fraction of their neighbours that have already
adopted it is above a certain threshold (which may differ for
individuals). However, how this initial seed set is identified is
not determined. One trend in research on diffusion is to inves-
tigate when innovations become persistent in the population.
For example, [Lo´pez-Pintado2008] presents a method to find
the threshold for the spreading rate above which a behaviour
spreads and becomes persistent in a certain population. This
work suggests that this threshold depends on the connectivity
distribution of the social network. Similarly, [Valente1996] is
focused on threshold models of collective behaviour which
explain how users can eventually have different rates of
adoption. Accordingly, there exist two levels of innovation
rates for a user: one macro, relative to the system, and one
micro, relative to her personal network. In [Kempe et al.2003],
[Bakshy et al.2011], the authors conclude that there exist some
influential nodes that foster diffusion of innovation throughout
the network. They present different probabilistic models that
allow estimating the node activation from the signals received
by other users. [Aral and Walker2012] show that influential
individuals tend not to be susceptible to influence from others,
while susceptible individuals tend not to be influential. Another
relevant approach is that of [Deroı¨an2002], in which the author
explains how the formation of the network affects the diffusion
process of the innovations.
Other works have studied the effect of clustering on inno-
vation diffusion such as on complex contagions (where indi-
viduals have high thresholds) and epidemics (where individu-
als have low thresholds) [Centola et al.2007], [Centola2010].
[Acemoglu et al.2011] introduce an extension to the notion
of cohesiveness and characterise the final set of adopters in
terms of what they call cohesive subsets. In their experimental
work, they assume the individuals in the initial seed set
are uniformly distributed over the network. They then show
that highly clustered networks may not necessarily be more
advantageous over less structured networks that contain large
numbers of random links. If there exists an initial seed node
within a cluster, this promotes diffusion, but if there is no
such initial seed node, then it is not as easy to penetrate the
cluster. In [Seeman and Singer2013], the authors present an
algorithm which provides a constant factor approximation to
the optimal adaptive policy for any influence function in the
triggering model. In [Luu et al.2012], a probabilistic model for
the diffusion process is presented and the conclusion reached
is that the degree distribution may dynamically change.
Our work is different in that we focus on identifying the
initial seed set: the most appropriate entry points to initiate the
innovation adoption and diffusion. To this end, we mine the
underlying structure of the network and utilise characteristics
of individual nodes such as influencing power to determine
the most promising entry points for seeding the innovation.
The aim of this paper is two-fold: i) to provide a mechanism
2for identifying suitable entry points for seeding innovation in
social networks in order to aid its early adoption and diffusion;
and, ii) to analyse the efficiency of the mechanism in terms
of cost and benefits. We present a set of experiments based
on two real social network datasets and a synthetic one that
shows the effects of deploying the mechanism.
II. NETWORK AND INDIVIDUAL MODELS
This section presents a model for the social network, as well
as a model for the innovation adoption of the user.
A. Social network model
A social network Ω can be modelled as a directed graph
GΩ = (V,E), in which V corresponds to a set of users
and E is a set of edges representing relationships in Ω. Let
(vi, vj) ∈ E, with vi, vj ∈ V , an edge in GΩ representing
a relationship from vi to vj . These relationships might de-
note, for example, follower-followee relations (e.g. Twitter),
friendship (e.g. Facebook), job links (e.g. LinkedIn), and so
on. The neighbourhood of a user is denoted as a function
neigh(vi) = {vj} iff. ∀vj∃(vi, vj) ∈ E.
We assume that users can communicate if there exists a
link between them, hence, if user vi wants to communicate
with vj , then there must exist a link (vi, vj) ∈ E. Users
communicate via signals: a signal sent by user vi - right after
adopting a certain innovation k - to another user vj is denoted
by σkvi→vj . We assume a signal σ
k is broadcasted to all of a
user’s neighbours when adopting the innovation k. An example
of this type of communication is Twitter: when users tweet
messages, these are broadcasted to all their followers.
There are three types of stakeholders in our model. Users
(S): are typical agents in a social network that may or may
not adopt an innovation and, if so, communicate it to their
neighbours. Innovation creators (IC): are agents that create
innovation (e.g. firms). Network explorers (NE): are agents
managed and deployed by the ICs and they are responsible
for exploring the network to identify promising users through
which to introduce the innovation into the network.
B. User behavioural model
Users are rational entities and when a user receives a signal
about an innovation, it reasons about the presented opportunity
and comes to a decision to adopt it or not. To model this
reasoning process of adoption, we adapt the model proposed
by [Bass1969]. In the Bass Model (BM), the probability of
innovation adoption of a user is calculated as follows:
Ak(t) = p+
q
N
·Nk(t) (1)
p is the coefficient of innovation (how innovative the user is), q
is the coefficient of imitation (how much the user is influenced
by others), Nk(t) is the total number of adopters up to time
t, and N is the total number of potential product buyers.
In our case, we regard users as only having a partial
view of the network, i.e. they only have knowledge about
their neighbours. Note that since we consider that different
innovations may take place at the same time, Ak denotes the
probability of adopting innovation k, while Nk is the number
of neighbours that have already adopted the specific innovation
k.
We assume that any link in the social network entails some
sort of influencing power among the users. For instance, in
Twitter, the action of following someone means the followed
has power over the follower, the former is somehow appealing
to or influential on the latter. Besides the inherent relation given
by the link between two users in the social network, profiles
could be utilised to obtain similarity measures among indi-
viduals since common interests usually foster the innovation
adoption. In order to include similarity between users into the
model, we extend equation 1 to represent the probability of
adoption. Given a received signal σkvi→· the resulting function
is presented in equation 2.
Ak(t) = α · p+ β ·
[
q
|neigh(·)| ·N
k
neigh(·)(t)
]
+ γ · sim(·, vi)
(2)
where Nkneigh(·)(t) is the number of neighbours that already
adopted the innovation up to time t1. Parameter α determines
the sensitivity of the user to internal forces (coefficient of
innovation) versus external forces (coefficient of imitation) to
adopt the innovation (parameter β). γ represents the degree of
belief the user has on the importance of the similarity with
its neighbours. Note that α + β + γ = 1 is a requirement.
We call this the Adapted Bass Model (A-BM). Note that this
function can cover different types of social networks. While in
Facebook similarity can be obtained through the users’ profiles,
in Twitter there is no such notion of profile features (γ = 0).
We represent user profiles as an n-dimensional preference
vector ρvi = (ρvi1 , ρ
vi
2 , ..., ρ
vi
n ) with ρ
vi
j ∈ {0, 1} denoting
that the user vi presents this feature (1) or it does not (0).
We calculate the similarity (sim function in eq. 2) by using
the Tanimoto similarity index [Tanimoto1958]. This function
is typically used to compare chemical molecules that can be
represented with an array of binary elements in chemical
processes. Since ρvi profiles are binary arrays, this index
appears to be an efficient way to calculate similarity, but other
methods could be used here depending on the complexity and
representation of the profile. Let users u and v be represented
by bitmaps ρu and ρv , ρui and ρ
v
i be the i-th bit of ρ
u and
ρv , respectively. Let ∧ , ∨ be bitwise and and or operators
respectively. Thus the Tanimoto similarity index is given by:
sim(u, v) =
∑
i ρ
u
i ∧ρvi∑
i ρ
u
i ∨ρvi . We assume that the contact between
an IC and a user to introduce a certain innovation k into the
network has an associated cost for the IC given by equation 3:
c(k) = c1 + c2 (3)
c1 ∈ R represents the cost for advertising the innovation (send
the signal to a user) and c2 is the cost associated with the
consumed resources used by the IC to persuade a user to
adopt the innovation (incentive). c2 = 0 represents no need
for incentives. c2 may be obtained with a function taking into
account the relative importance of the user in the network.
1The notation (·) refers to the user doing the calculation.
3We define an example of this type of function in Section IV
when setting up a test scenario for empirical evaluation. Note
that the cost is only applicable when there exists any sort of
communication between the IC and a user is selected as entry
point; the diffusion phase does not have any cost for the IC.
III. THE SISM MECHANISM
The proposed mechanism for identifying and choosing suit-
able entry points for innovation in a social network relies on
the identification of well positioned users (from a structural
perspective) [Goldenberg et al.2009], and those that have the
ability to influence others [Fasli2006] in adopting an innova-
tion. Since diffusion depends on the users’ acceptance of the
innovation, we focus on the innovation seeding, which is the
only process the IC has control over. We call our approach
Social Innovation Seeding Mechanism (hereafter SISM).
IDENTIFYING HUBS. We use different measures from social
networks based on the well-studied property of centrality
to infer which are the most promising users to introduce
the innovation into the network. The concept of centrality
encapsulates “micro” measures that allow us to compare nodes
and to say something about how a given node relates to the
overall network [Jackson2008]. Many different measures of
centrality have been developed, and each tends to capture
different aspects of the position that a node has, which can
be useful when working with information flows, infection
transmission, and other behaviours in a network. We use the
following centrality measures to identify hubs:
Degree: it represents the number of links that a node has.
The degree centrality of a node vi ∈ V is: DCvi = d(vi)|V |−1 ,
where d(vi) denotes the out-degree of node vi in the network.
Betweenness: it is a measure based on how well a user is
situated on the paths it lies on [Freeman1977]. Let np(vj , vk)
be the number of paths between vj ∈ V and vk ∈ V
and npvi(vj , vk) the number of paths between vj and vk
on which vi ∈ V lies on. Then we obtain the centrality
of node vi in terms of connecting vj and vk as the ratio
npvi(vj , vk)/np(vj , vk). Generalising to obtain the between-
ness centrality of node vi:
BCvi =
∑
vj 6=vk 6=vi
npvi (vj ,nk)/np(vj ,vk)
(|V |−1)·(|V |−2)/2
PageRank: this well-known algorithm measures the impor-
tance of a node in terms of the fraction of time spent at that
node relative to all other nodes in a random walk throughout
the network. Formally: PRvi = (1 − λ) + λ∑nj=1 PRvjd(vj) ,
where λ is an attenuation parameter (we set it to 0.15 in the
experiments), and d(·) is the out-degree of a node.
The mechanism will use one of these measures in order to
identify a ranking of “central” users that essentially comprise
hubs in the network, having a preference for introducing the
innovation through the users in the top of this ranking.
IDENTIFYING POWER. We propose a method to assess the
power that a subset of selected hubs (typically the top ones
in the aforementioned ranking) exercise on others. We adhere
to the notion of referent power [Fasli2006], as power deriving
from identification. We say a user vi has power2 on user vj iff.
2For clarity we use power to refer to referent power.
there exists a connection (vi, vj) ∈ E and, when vi sends a
signal σkvi→vj user vj automatically adopts innovation k. Then,
we can say user vi somehow influences vj to adopt k.
In order to assess a user’s power, Innovation Creators (ICs)
use the so-called network explorers (NEs). The IC will add an
NE in the network connecting it to a relevant user in order to
monitor and estimate the latter’s power. Note that in some
social networks this process may be more complex, since
connecting with an individual requires bilateral agreement
(e.g. LinkedIn). We assume NEs can always connect to a
selected user or, at least monitor her signals. Algorithms 1
and 2 provide the steps for the power estimation. To examine
Algorithm 1 connectExplorer(·) algorithm that introduces
the explorer into the network
Require: vexp ∈ NE, vi ∈ V the user whose power is
estimated
1: E ← E ∪ (vi, vexp)
2: for each vj in neigh(vi) do
3: E ← E ∪ (vj , vexp)
4: end for
the power user vi has in the network, we add an NE vexp
and connect it to vi (Algorithm 1, line 1). Once this initial
connection is made, our algorithm also connects vexp to all
of vi’s neighbours (lines 2–4). Our intention with this step is
for vexp to be aware of the signals sent by vi when adopting
an innovation but also the signals sent by its neighbours so
that we can track the power of influence on them. Algorithm 2
presents a method to calculate the power of a user vi by taking
advantage of the connections made in Algorithm 1 (line 1).
Firstly, the explorer vexp listens for any signal (line 2).
When vexp receives a signal from vi (line 5), this necessarily
implies that its neighbours have received it as well. Therefore,
each neighbour, as explained in Section II-B, must decide if it
accepts the innovation signalled by vi or not. If the innovation
is accepted, a new signal will be forwarded, and so received
by vexp (line 7). Explorer vexp will annotate different signals
received from vi’s neighbours (line 8). We then calculate the
ratio of adopted innovations after vi’s signal (line 10). The
algorithm returns a value of power as a linear combination of
past influence calculated for vi and the new influence ratio
calculated (line 15). Parameter δ represents sensitivity of past
influence in contrast to new one. Inevitably, influence very
much depends on the user’s position in the network. The same
user in another location may result in exercising very different
influence on its neighbours. This occurs because it is the
recipient that decides whether to adopt or not the innovation. In
other words, the influencer’s power arises from the neighbours
around it, which are biased to be influenced, rather than by
the influencer’s pro-active attitude to exercise that power. Once
vexp has accomplished its task, it returns the influence estimate
to its IC. The IC may repeat the process with other users it
may consider being promising entry points for the innovation.
Finally, the IC will decide on the best entry points and send a
signal to the selected user(s).
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Require: vexp ∈ NE, vi ∈ V the user whose power is
estimated; pastInfluence← 0
1: connectExplorer(vexp, vi)
2: while true do
3: positive← 0
4: newInfluence← 0
5: if signalReceived then
6: for each j in neigh(vi) do
7: if signalReceived then
8: positive+ +
9: end if
10: newInfluence← possitive/|neigh(vi)|
11: end for
12: if pastInfluence == 0 then
13: return newInfluence
14: else
15: return δ·pastInfluence+(1−δ)·newInfluence
16: end if
17: end if
18: end while
IV. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
We are interested in exploring whether SISM can help an
IC identify the best entry point according to its cost-benefit.
In earlier work, some of the authors explored whether SISM
helps the IC identify appropriate entry points for the adoption
and diffusion of innovation, and the potential impact that the
underlying network structure may have on the performance
of the algorithm. In this work, we explore the impact of the
budget limitations and the cost to incentivise the user to adopt
the innovation at the entry point.
For simplicity, we only follow through and show in action
one IC trying to introduce sequentially multiple innovations.
Moreover we assume an IC typically deploys one NE per
hub to be studied, in our case the top 10% of ranked users
returned from the hub identification phase. In the first time
step, the IC uses one (but it could be a combination) of the
centrality methods to identify the candidate initial seed set
and subsequently estimates the power of these users to identify
which users will be selected as the entry points. It then sends a
signal to each selected user with the innovation. The signalled
user then decides to accept (or not) the innovation. If it accepts
it (as per the adoption function in Eq. 2), the user will send a
signal to its neighbours (considered at the next time step). If
the entry point user does not accept the innovation, then the
IC will offer an incentive.
The economic model used for the incentive to be paid to
the initial adopters is the return to scale. Accordingly, there
is a positive return to scale where there is a positive cost-
benefits’ non-linear relationship [Ferguson2008]. By assuming
a positive return to scale, we also assume that better connected
users will require higher incentives since they are supposed to
be more effective entry points. For this reason, the IC has
to identify the user(s) that best fit its budget constraint. The
incentive the IC will pay is calculated as:
Incentive =
C
pos(.)
(4)
where pos(.) is the user’s position in the ranking of hubs
as calculated, and C is a constant that may vary in different
domains. We set C = 1000 for this set of experiments.
Note that based on the return to scale model, the cost of the
incentive is a non-linear positive function of the position of
the initial adopter. This means that a better positioned initial
adopter is more capable of showing positively crescent non-
linear benefits than a worse positioned initial adopter.
The IC selects the user according to its cost (which depends
on the user’s position), and its budget constraint. For example,
suppose the budget constraint is 500. According to Eq. 4, the
cost of the better positioned user is 1000. This is above the
budget constraint, and hence, this user does not receive any
incentive. The cost of the next best positioned user (2nd) is
500 which is equal to the budget constraint, and hence, this
user receives the incentive. Thus, the smaller the budget, the
lower the position of the user in the ranking that receives
the incentive. After the initial entry point and incentivisation
phase, the next time step starts with users processing the
received signals. This is repeated every time step until no new
signals are sent out, at which point the diffusion converges.
We have used three datasets for our experimental work.
The first dataset [McAuley and Leskovec2012] was collected
from surveying participants using a Facebook application.
This network contains 333 users and 5038 links among them
denoting reciprocal friendships (all edges in the graph are bidi-
rectional) comprising ‘circles’ (or ‘friends lists’). This dataset
also includes node features (profiles) that are used by the SISM
mechanism to calculate the similarity between users. The sec-
ond dataset is based on Twitter [McAuley and Leskovec2012]
with 242 users, but does not include profile information. These
two datasets have the characteristics of scale-free networks.
In such networks, there are certain sets of vertices with a
degree that greatly exceeds the average (hub nodes). We
have also created an artificial network of the same size as
the Facebook dataset (i.e. 333 nodes) as a poorly connected
network in order to see the effects of the SISM mechanism
with varying budgets. We experimented with larger sizes of
poorly connected networks (up to 10,000 agents), but the
results are similar as for the smaller size network, hence we
report these here for comparative purposes.
For our experiments, we use three different centrality
measures: Degree, Betweeness and PageRank. We run nine
treatments based on the combination of centrality measures
and datasets. On every combination we tested seven different
budget constraints (10, 25, 50, 100, 250, 500 and 1000), on ten
different initial nodes. The results presented are the average of
10 runs (for each experiment) with different random seeds to
set up different initial user populations (different parameters in
eq. 2). Our aim is to test the ability of higher budget constraints
to generate higher number of adopters or to increase the speed
of the adoption compared to lower budgets. We have also
tested the performance of SISM against a Random selection
5strategy (what in marketing, for instance, could be compared
to a broadcasting strategy) in which entry points are selected
in a random manner.
As we are interested in testing the cost-benefit to incentivise
initial adopters, we measure the cost benefits of the incentive
comparing three different parameters among the budget con-
straints: the convergence rate, the total number of adopters and
the initial number of adopters.
A. Results of evolution of the numbers of adopters
In this section, we show in detail the results of the experi-
ment that analyses the convergence rate and the total number of
adopters on the diffusion of innovation with the three different
datasets (Facebook, Poor and Twitter). On every treatment with
an individual dataset, we show the evolution of the number of
adopters among the three SISM centrality measures (Degree,
Betweenness and PageRank).
1) Facebook Dataset Results: The results shown in Figures
1 and 2 provide insights on the convergence rate and final num-
bers of adopters of the innovation with the Facebook dataset.
Firstly, the convergence rate is very similar between different
budget levels when using the Degree and PageRank centrality
measures regardless the budget constraint. Note in Figure 2
that it is not possible to identify a budget constraint level that
could lead to a higher convergence rate. This means that the
budget constraint level has no influence on the convergence
rate.
Secondly, even though the convergence rate for different
budget constraint levels are similar when using the Degree
and PageRank centrality measures, these convergence rates
are higher than the case of random selection. This can be
viewed clearly in Figure 1 as the curve of the random selection
convergence is below every curve on the SISM Degree and
PageRank centrality measures regardless the budget constraint
level.
Thirdly, the convergence rate is different among the various
budget levels when the Betweenness centrality measure is used
as part of the SISM mechanism. Differently to SISM Degree
and PageRank centrality measures, Figure 2 shows that differ-
ent budget constraint levels lead to a different convergence rate
when using the SISM Betweenness centrality measure. Note
that the curves are dispersed, with some curves below the curve
of the random selection convergence rate, while other curves
are above the random selection.
Fourthly, Figure 2 suggests that regardless the level of the
budget constraint, the final number of adopters is very similar
in the three SISM centrality measures used in this treatment.
This means that this worthless to incentive the well connect
initial adopters if the objective is only to reach as much user
as possible. For this reason, we argue that the incentive should
focus only on the number of initial adopters, not on the number
of final adopters.
2) Twitter Dataset Results: The results shown in Figures 3
and 4 provide a series of insights regarding the convergence
rate and final numbers of adopters of the innovation with
the Twitter dataset. Firstly, similarly to the Facebook dataset,
the convergence rate is very similar between for the SISM
Degree and PageRank centrality measures and this appears to
be regardless the budget constraint. Note in Figure 3 that it is
not possible to identify the budget constraint level that could
lead to a higher convergence rate. This means that the budget
constraint level has no influence on the convergence rate.
Secondly, the convergence rate appears to differ for the
various budget levels for the SISM Betweenness centrality
measure. Unlike the SISM Degree and PageRank centrality
measures, Figure 4 shows that different budget constraint
levels lead to a different convergence rate when the SISM
Betweenness centrality measure is used.
From Figure 3 note that there is peak down for low values of
Budget in the SISM Betweenness centrility measure’s 3D-plot.
This that could mean that this worths to increase the value to
incentive well connected intial adopters for this SISM centrility
measure.
Finally, Figure 4 shows that the convergence rates are higher
to the random selection for all SISM centrality measures,
regardless the budget constraint levels. Figure 4 also suggests
that the final number of adopters is very similar for the three
SISM centrality measures used in this treatment regardless the
budget constraint levels used.
3) Poor Dataset Results: As indicated earlier, in addition to
conducting experiments with data from real social networks
we created an artificial poorly connected network equal in
size to the Facebook network. The results shown in Figures
5 and 6 illustrate the results regarding the convergence rate
and final number of adopters with this “Poor” dataset. The
first observation is that the convergence rate is not similar for
the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures and
various budget constraint levels. Interestingly note the valley
in the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures as
shown in the 3D-plot graphs of Figure 5 . The analysis of
this valley is not straight forward. The point is that this is
not an expected result. Perhaps, this is not possible to assure
that the impact of the budget constraint’s level on both SISM
centrality measures is not positively correlated to the level of
budget constraint.
Secondly, the convergence rate is similar for the different
budget constraint levels when the SISM PageRank centrality
measure is used. Unlike the SISM Degree and Betweenness
centrality measures, Figure 5 shows that with the SISM
Betweenness centrality measure, the convergence rate is very
similar in the presence of different budget constraint levels.
This can be observed in Figure 5 where the 3D-Plot for
the SISM PageRank centrality measure is smooth, unlike the
3D-Plots for the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality
measures which is rather jagged. The shape of the 3D-Plot for
the SISM PageRank centrality measure is expected because
this is similar to the shape of 3D-Plot for this SISM centrality
measure in Figure 1 and in Figure 3. The question remains
on the valley present in the 3D-Plot for the SISM Degree and
Betweenness centrality measure.
Thridly, Figure 6 shows that the convergence rates of the
SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures are close
to the random selection. In fact, at the start of the diffusion
process and when the SISM Degree and Betweenness central-
ity measures are used, the random selection shows a higher
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Fig. 1. Number of adopters for the Facebook dataset vs the number to ticks and the level of budget constraint for the three SISM centrality measures(Degree,
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Fig. 3. Number of adopters for the Twitter dataset vs the number to ticks and the level of budget constraint for the three SISM centrality measures(Degree,
Betweenness and PageRank)
number of adopters; this only changes closer to the tenth tick
in time.
Finally, Figure 6 shows that the convergence rate of the
PageRank centrality measure is higher to the random selection
and this is irrespective of the budget constraint level used.
Furthermore and in contrast to some of the results observed
when the SISM Degree and Betweenness centrality measures
are used, the number of adopters when using the PageRank
centrality measure and at about the tenth tick, is near 250,
more than twice the number of adopters when using random
selection.
B. Comparative results for initial adopters
We would like to study the relation between the budget
constraint level and the number of initial adopters and in this
section, we show the results of the experiment with the three
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Fig. 5. Number of adopters for the Poor dataset vs the number to ticks and the level of budget constraint for the three SISM centrality measures(Degree,
Betweenness and PageRank)
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Fig. 6. Evolution of adopters on different budgets with centrality measures vs Random in the Poor dataset
different datasets (Facebook, Poor and Twitter) that analyse
the impact of the budget constraint level on the number of
initial adopters. In particular, we examine the number of initial
adopters which comprises those adopters that after having
been identified as part of the initial seed set as an outcome
of one of the three centrality measures used by the SISM
mechanism (Degree, Betweenness and PageRank), they were
incentivised by a payment within the confines of the specific
budget constraint used, and subsequent to that payment, they
adopted the innovation. We discuss the results per centrality
measure used.
I think we need a few sentences here to describe how
random selection was done here so that the reader can
understand what we are comparing against
1) Degree: The results shown in Figure 7 suggest four
insights that can be drawn about the diffusion of innovation
using the SISM Degree centrality measure. Firstly, it appears
that the budget constraint is positively correlated to the number
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Fig. 7. Results for Degree centrality measure
of initial adopters. This can be seen from that the bar chart
is crescent along the budget constraint on every dataset. Even
though with Poor dataset, this is only evident from the budget
constraint of 250 monetary unities.
Secondly, lower levels of incentives result in the number of
initial adopters being inferior to the random selection entry
point with the Facebook dataset. As can be observed, it is
only worth incentivising some initial adopters if the budget is
above 50 monetary units, otherwise, this is preferable to select
randomly the initial adopters.
Thirdly, the results suggest that the use of incentives is
not worthwhile with the Twitter dataset. When using random
selection of entry points, the number of initial adopters is over
70, while even with the highest budget constraint, the number
of initial adopters only reaches between 30 and 40.
Finally, the return to scale is decreasing with the budget
constraint level. For example, while a budget of 10 monetary
units results in approximately 10 initial adopters with the Twit-
ter dataset, a budget of 1000 monetary unities (100x higher)
results in approximately 30 initial adopters (3x higher). What
this in essence tells us, is that depending on the underlying
network structure, in some cases, it is not worth providing
huge incentives (in the form of payment, free products etc.)
as this will not make a significant difference in the number of
initial adopters. Therefore the level of incentivisation needs to
be chosen carefully.
2) Betweenness: Examining the results illustrated in Figure
8, we can draw the following conclusions on using the SISM
mechanism with the Betweenness centrality measure. Firstly,
the budget constraint is not correlated to the number of initial
adopters. Unlike the discernible patterns that we can see
in Figure 7 for the Degree centrality measure, the results
illustrated in Figure 8 appear to have no specific pattern that
can be easily deduced. For example, with the Twitter dataset,
the number of initial adopters with the budget constraint of 25
monetary units is higher to the budget constraint of 50, 100
and 250 monetary units; but lower to the number of adopters
with budget constraints of 500 and 1000 monetary units.
Hence, the results do not provide conclusive evidence that
the use of incentives results in the number of initial adopters
being higher than by using the random selected entry points.
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Fig. 8. Results for Betweenness centrality measure
Indeed in the Facebook and Poor datasets the differences that
we see in the number of adopters even when the budget
constraint increases are very small. Counterintuitively, in the
Facebook dataset a budget of 25 yields a higher number of
adopters than a budget of 500.
Finally, similar to the diffusion of innovation with the SISM
Degree centrality measure, the return to scale is decreasing
with the budget constraint. For example, while a budget of
10 monetary units results in approximately 20 initial adopters
with the Twitter dataset, a budget of 1000 (100x higher) results
in approximately 160 initial adopters (8x higher).
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Fig. 9. Results for PageRank centrality measure
3) PageRank: The results shown in Figure 9 provide two
different insights about the diffusion of innovation with the
SISM PageRank centrality measure. Firstly, the budget con-
straint is not correlated to the number of initial adopters. We
can see that all of the datasets show similar number of initial
adopters regardless the level of the budget constraint.
Secondly, and unlike the Betweenness centrality measure, as
can be seen, with all three datasets of the experiment, the use of
incentives results in the number of initial adopters being higher
to randomly selected entry points. For example, even with the
Poor dataset, the number of initial adopters based on incentives
is around 100, while the number of initial adopters when
9randomly selecting entry points is below 20 (approximately
5x lower).
Finally, similar to the two previous cases of using the Degree
and Betweenness centrality measures, Figure 9 suggests that
the return to scale is indifferent to the budget constraint.
For example, while a budget of 10 monetary units results in
approximately 20 initial adopters with the Twitter dataset, a
budget of 1000 (100x higher) results in approximately 160
initial adopters (8x higher).
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we consider the results discussed in the pre-
ceding sections and draw our conclusions. Firstly, the results
suggest that there is no benefit from low budget levels because
this can lead to a selection of an initial set of adopters which is
inferior to the set of randomly selected adopters. This means
that if a firm is interested in increasing the number of initial
adopters, it will have to invest significant funds, otherwise
the benefit from lower budgets is questionable. Lower budget
levels entail that users that are less central will be chosen
to be incentivised (as users further up the centrality ranking
would require higher payments) which may further impact the
diffusion process in the next step as they will inevitably be
less influential.
Secondly, we can surmise that there may be a level beyond
which it would be worth to incentivise some initial adopters.
Even though at this stage of our work it is not possible to
determined what this level may be, the results suggest that
such a level may exist. This would mean that above this budget
level, it would be worth offering incentives as these would
increase the number of initial adopters, but below this level, a
firm would be better off just selecting random entry points.
Thirdly, we cannot conclusively say whether the number of
initial adopters is positively correlated to the budget constraint
levels, as we do not see the same patterns emerging from the
use of different budget constrain levels and centrality measures
equally across all datasets. Even though we can observe a
positive correlation in some combinations of datasets and
SISM centrality measures, such as the Twitter dataset and the
SISM Degree centrality measure, we cannot draw this as a
generic conclusion.
Finally, focusing only on the positive correlated combination
of dataset SISM centrality measure. The results suggest that
the return to scale is decreasing to the budget constraint. For
example, with the SISM Degree centrality measure, while a
budget of 10 results in approximately 10 initial adopters, a
budget of 1000 (100x higher) results in approximately 30
initial adopters (3x higher). It could suggest that this could
be more efficient to incentive some initial adopter who has the
cost that is near to the level in which it is worth to incentive
adopters.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the problem of determining the
set of users to be targeted (seed set) to initiate the processes
of adoption and diffusion of an innovation. To identify the
elements of the seed set we mine the underlying structure
of the network and utilise characteristics of individual nodes
such as influencing (referent) power to determine the most
promising entry points for seeding the innovation. In addition,
we study the impact of the budget limitations and the cost to
incentivise the user to adopt the innovation at the entry point.
The economic model used for the incentive to be paid to the
initial adopters is the return to scale which assumes that there
is a positive return to scale where there is a positive cost-
benefits non-linear relationship. Accordingly, better connected
users will have to be paid more since they are assumed to be
more effective entry points.
We have described the experiments conducted involving
two real social network datasets and a synthetic one. Based
on the results obtained, we can draw the following main
conclusions. Firstly, the results suggest that there is no benefit
from low budget levels because this can lead to an initial set
of adopters selected which is inferior to the set of randomly
selected adopters. Secondly, there is a budget point above
which it is worth to incentive some initial adopters. Thirdly, the
number of initial adopters is positively correlated to the budget
constraint levels. Finally, the results suggest that the return
to scale is decreasing; for example, with the SISM centrality
Degree, while a budget of 10 results in approximately 10
initial adopters, a budget of 1000 (100x higher) results in
approximately 30 initial adopters (3x higher).
Hence, our results have shown that using the SISM mecha-
nism enables us to identify appropriate entry points to initiate
the innovation adoption and diffusion processes. Targeting
those entry points rather than random users yields better
results. In particular, in relation to incentivising users to adopt
the promoted innovations, we observe that this can have an
effect, though there appears to be a cut-off budget level beyond
which the return to scale is decreasing. Hence, budgets for
incentivisation of users need to be carefully drawn.
There are several avenues for future work. Firstly, we
would like to experiment with larger social network datasets.
Secondly, we are interested in exploring the effects of ICs
competing in the market for closely related innovations and
in addition adding (product/services) preferences and budget
constraints on the user side that in reality can constrain a
user from adopting an innovation, no matter how attractive
or desirable this innovation may be. A third direction is to
study an extension of the mechanism in order to deal with
dynamic social networks, in which structural properties change
due to the evolution of the links in the network. Finally, a forth
direction is to model the level that it starts to worth to incentive
initial adopters
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